EOIR–the Executive Office for Immigration Review–has proposed a fee increase for applications before the Immigration Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The new fees purportedly reflect the cost of adjudicating the various applications that EOIR reviews, and include the following–
Increase the fee for Form EOIR-26 (Notice of Appeal from a Decision of an Immigration Judge) from $110 to $975.
Increase the fee for Form EOIR-29 (Notice of Appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals from a Decision of a DHS Officer) from $110 to $705.
Increase the fee for Form EOIR-40 (Application for Suspension of Deportation) from $100 to $305.
Increase the fee for Form EOIR-42A (Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents) from $100 to $305.
Increase the fee for Form EOIR-42B (Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents) from $100 to $360.
Increase the fee for filing a motion to reopen or reconsider with the immigration court from $110 to $145.
Increase the fee for filing a motion to reopen or reconsider with the BIA from $110 to $895,
Also, the new fees include a $50 fee for asylum cases filed with the Immigration Court (I wrote about this previously after USCIS proposed a similar fee for asylum cases filed with that agency).
EOIR hopes to revive the tradition of paying your executioner.
As you can see, the new fees are significantly higher than the current fees. EOIR Director James McHenry justifies the fee increase as follows–
The proposed fee increases are marginal in terms of inflation-adjusted dollars and would mitigate the significant taxpayer subsidization of these forms and motions. EOIR is long past due for a review of its fee-based filings, especially as its caseload and costs have increased substantially since 1986.
As usual, Mr. McHenry’s comments reflect his lack of compassion for vulnerable immigrants, not to mention his tenuous grasp of reality. A 900% fee increase for BIA appeals is certainly not “marginal,” and will likely preclude many people from exercising their right to due process of law. Sadly, though, the rights of immigrants have never been a priority or a concern for Mr. McHenry, at least as far as I can tell, and so his comments are hardly surprising.
Now, to be fair, EOIR has not increased fees for 30 years, and so a review of current fees is overdue, and a reasonable fee increase could certainly be justified. Let’s take, for example, the most impactful of the new fees, the fee to appeal an Immigration Court decision to the BIA. The current fee is $110. According to EOIR, had this fee been adjusted for inflation (starting in 1986), it would be $252.63 in today’s dollars. So in that sense, the current fee is less than it should be (whatever that means). The new proposed fee of $975 is nearly nine times the current fee, but “only” about four times the adjusted-for-inflation fee.
Also, a fee waiver may be available for those who need it, using form EOIR-26A. This form (at least in its current iteration) is fairly simple, and seeks information about the applicant’s income and expenses. It’s not clear how much evidence is needed to support the contentions in the form, but given the wide latitude of adjudicators to grant or deny a fee waiver, it seems to me that the wise applicant will include significant supporting evidence (which may require a lot of work). Pursuant to the regulations, EOIR has the “discretion” to grant a fee waiver. However, the regulations also indicate that, “if the fee waiver request does not establish the inability to pay the required fee, the appeal or motion will not be deemed properly filed.” Does this mean that an appeal filed along with a fee waiver will be rejected if the fee waiver is denied? Will EOIR provide some type of notice, so that applicants can raise the fee and pay for their appeal? How much time will EOIR allow to pay the fee? It’s hard to be optimistic about any of this, given that the whopping new fees seem purposely designed to dissuade applicants from pursuing their rights before the Immigration Courts and the BIA.
Finally, EOIR’s main justification for the new fees is that costs for the agency have increased, and raising fees will help cover EOIR’s expenses and protect tax payers–to the tune of about $45 million per year. To come up with their numbers, EOIR completed a study where they looked at who adjudicates the various applications, how long it takes, and how much it costs (taking into account salaries, but not other expenses such as overhead or employee benefits). How accurate is this study? I have no idea. Different appeals, for example, require very different amounts of work. Some appeals are simple; others are complicated. But even assuming the new fees accurately reflect EOIR’s expenses, I think that fee increases of this magnitude are unfair for two main reasons.
First, EOIR’s justification for these fees is a con job. They talk about the expenses of immigrants, but not the contributions of immigrants to our society. The Trump Administration tried this trick at least once before, when it suppressed a study showing that refugees contribute more to our economy than they take, and instead released a distorted study, listing only the costs of helping refugees. You simply can’t separate out the costs of maintaining an immigration system from the benefits we as a nation derive from that system. Yet that is what EOIR is doing here: Director McHenry decries the expenses to the system, but we learn nothing about how immigrants contribute to our economy (and the weight of the evidence indicates that immigration benefits our economy).
Second, in its mission statement, EOIR indicates that it “is committed to providing fair, expeditious, and uniform application of the nation’s immigration laws in all cases.” How can it fulfill this mission if the people before the Immigration Courts and the BIA cannot afford the relief to which they are entitled? To have a functioning legal system, people in our country need access to courts–civil courts, criminal courts, and immigration courts, among others. Our’s is not (and should not be) a nation where you receive only the justice you can afford. Non-citizens who live in our country should not be an exception to this rule. Or, as the indefatigable Paul Wickham Schmidt writes—
Correcting errors on appeal is probably one of the most important functions the Government performs. That’s particularly true when the public segment “served” is generally limited income individuals and the getting results correct could be “life determining.”
At this stage, the new fees are proposed, but not yet in effect. The public can submit comments about the proposal, and perhaps that will cause EOIR to modify its plan. To submit comments, see page 2 of the proposed rule.
Make no mistake, these proposed fees are another attack on immigrants, justified with half truths, and implemented because immigrants are too vulnerable to fight back. All people of good conscience should continue to resist these terrible policies, which directly impact our non-citizen neighbors, but which, in the end, harm us all.
MaryBeth Keller was the Chief Immigration Judge of the United States from September 2016 until July 2019. She was the first woman to hold that position. The Asylumist sat down with her to discuss her career, her tenure as CIJ, and her hope for the future of the Immigration Courts.
Asylumist: Tell us about your career. How did you get to be the Chief Immigration Judge of the United States?
Judge Keller: I was appointed to the position by Attorney General Loretta Lynch in 2016. By that time, I had been at EOIR (the Executive Office for Immigration Review) for 28 years, and had a lot of experience with and knowledge of the entire organization, especially the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (“OCIJ”) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).
After law school at the University of Virginia, I clerked for state court judges in Iowa. I wanted to return to DC, and in those days – the late 1980s – there were a lot of options. I submitted my resume to a federal government database and was selected to interview at the BIA for a staff attorney position (they liked the fact that I had taken an immigration law class with Professor David Martin at UVA). At the interview, I knew it would be an incredible job. The BIA is the highest level administrative body in immigration law, and the people I met seemed happy to be there. I thought I would stay maybe two years and then move on, but I ended up remaining with EOIR for 31 years.
MaryBeth Keller
I was at the BIA for about 15 years, nine of those as a manager. In my early days as a staff attorney, I helped revitalize the BIA union, which was basically defunct when I arrived. Some employees had wanted to simply decertify the union, but a colleague and I convinced the majority of attorneys and staff that it could be a useful organization, so they voted to keep it. I was the union president for several years. After I later became a manager, my colleagues joked that my penance for having led the BIA union was to have to deal with the union from the other side. I helped then-Chairman Paul Schmidt revamp and restructure the BIA in the mid-1990s.
From there, I served as EOIR’s General Counsel and was involved with many reforms, including the institution of the first fraud program and a program to address complaints about the conduct of Immigration Judges. This ultimately led to my appointment as the first Assistant Chief Immigration Judge (“ACIJ”) for Conduct and Professionalism (“C&P”). At the time, David Neal was the Chief Immigration Judge, and we built the C&P program from whole cloth. In addition to responsibility for judge conduct, performance, and disciplinary issues, I supervised courts from headquarters and was the management representative to the judges’ union. All of this experience led to me to the position of Chief Judge.
Asylumist: What does the CIJ do? How is that position different from the EOIR Director or General Counsel?
Judge Keller: I view the CIJ’s job as leading the trial level immigration courts to execute the mission of EOIR, including, most importantly, managing the dockets to best deliver due process. In practical terms, this involved hiring and training judges and staff, determining the supervisory structure of the courts, directing the management team of Deputies, ACIJs, and Court Administrators, overseeing the Headquarters team that supports the field, including an administrative office, a business development team, legal advisers, an organizational results unit, and an interpreters unit. The CIJ also collaborates with the other senior executives such as the Chairman of the BIA, the General Counsel, and the Director of Administration to coordinate agency activities on a broader scale. In years past, the CIJ acted as a high-level liaison with counterparts in DHS, the private bar, and other governmental and nongovernmental groups.
The regulations–specifically 8 C.F.R. 1003.9–describe the function of the CIJ. I kept a copy of that regulation on my wall. The regulations set forth the CIJ’s authority to issue operational instructions and policy, provide for training of the immigration judges and other staff, set priorities or time frames for the resolution of cases, and manage the docket of matters to be decided by the immigration judges.
Despite the regulation, under the current Administration, much of the CIJ’s, authority has been assumed by the Director’s Office or the newly created Office of Policy. Court operational instructions, court policy, the provision of training, setting priorities and time frames for case disposition, and many other matters are now being performed by the EOIR Director’s Office, with minimal input from the CIJ and OCIJ management. I do recognize the regulation setting forth the authority of the Director, as well as the fact that the CIJ’s authority is subject to the Director’s supervision. However, reliance on career employees and specifically the career senior executives (Senior Executive Service or SES) at the head of each EOIR component is significantly diminished now. I believe that is compromising the effectiveness of EOIR as a whole. Senior Executives have leadership skills and incredible institutional knowledge and experience that should bridge that gap between policy and operations. They should be a part of developing the direction of the agency and its structure to most effectively accomplish its functions, but are instead largely sidelined and relegated to much more perfunctory tasks. I worry that people with valuable skills will not be satisfied with decreased levels of responsibility, and will leave the agency. This will make it more difficult for EOIR to meet the challenges it is facing.
To answer the question as to how the CIJ position is different from the Director and General Counsel, the EOIR Director manages all the components of the Agency (BIA, OCIJ, Administration, and OGC) and reports to the Deputy Attorney General. The EOIR General Counsel provides legal and other advice to the EOIR component heads and the Director.
Asylumist: What were your goals and accomplishments as CIJ? Is there anything you wanted to do but could not get done?
Judge Keller: I was fortunate to serve as the CIJ at a time of many changes: Hiring an unprecedented number of IJs, finally beginning to implement electronic filing, and creating new ways to effectively complete cases. At the same time, we faced challenges, such as the ever-changing prioritization of certain types of cases, an increased focus on speed of adjudication, and the creation of the new Office of Policy within the agency, which was given far-reaching authority.
Amid these changes, one of my goals was to use my experience at the agency and my credibility to reassure judges and staff that, despite any changes, our mission of delivering fair hearings and fair decisions would remain unchanged. I always told new classes of judges that their primary responsibility was to conduct fair hearings and make fair decisions. Due process is what we do. And if we don’t get that right, we are not fulfilling the mission of the immigration court. I had the sense that my presence as CIJ gave people some level of security that we were holding on to that mission during all of the change.
Another goal was to hire more staff. I thought I would have more control over hiring and court management than I ultimately did. In terms of hiring, while we greatly increased the number of IJs, it is important to remember that IJs cannot function without support staff: Court administrators, legal assistants, clerks, interpreters, and others. The ratio is about 1-5, judges to support staff. Our hope was also to have one law clerk per IJ and we made some major progress in that regard. It might be wiser for EOIR to take a breather from hiring more judges and focus on hiring support staff, because that is imperative for the court to function. Overall, I was not able to prioritize staff hiring as I would have liked, nor was I confident that my office’s input had much impact on hiring decisions.
Aside from hiring many more judges, some of the positive changes we made while I was there included implementing shortened oral decisions–we do not need a 45-page decision in every case. Shorter decisions, where appropriate, are vital to increasing efficiency. We also encouraged more written decisions. It seems counterintuitive, but written decisions can actually be more efficient than oral decisions. If you have the written material available, as well as law clerks, and the administrative time to review the decision, written decisions save the time that would be spent delivering the oral decision and that time can be used for additional hearings. For this purpose, we greatly increased the accessibility of legal resources for both judges and staff through the development of a highly detailed and searchable user-friendly electronic database of caselaw, decisions, and other reference material.
Importantly, we were also working on ways to replace the standard scheduling based on Individual and Master Calendar Hearings. Instead, in a manner more like other courts, we would schedule cases according to the particular needs of the case, including creating, for example, a motions docket, a bond docket, a short-matters docket. Cases would be sent to certain dockets depending on what issues needed to be addressed, and then move through the process as appropriate from there. Different judges might work on one case, depending on what was needed. During the course of this process, many cases would resolve at the earliest possible point, and some would fall out–people leave the country, they obtain other relief, etc. But in the meantime, such cases would not have taken up a normally-allotted four hour Individual Calendar hearing block in the IJ’s schedule. We were looking to do at least three things: Secure a certain trial date at the start of proceedings, allot time judiciously to each matter, and reduce the time between hearings. If the immigration courts could successfully transition to this model, it would improve the timeliness and rate of completion of final decisions.
While I was CIJ, we also looked to see how other courts dealt with issues such as technology. For example, we went to see the electronic systems at the Fairfax County, Virginia court. That system is more advanced than EOIR’s, and it would, for example, allow a judge to give advisals that are simultaneously translated into different languages for different listeners. This would eliminate the time it takes to do individual advisals, without sacrificing the face-to-face time with the judge. We also investigated video remote interpreting, which is having the interpreter in the courtroom via video, so everyone can see and hear each other as if they were in the same place. IT infrastructure to properly support such initiatives is very expensive, but is obviously currently available and used by other court systems. Changes like improving the interpretation system and implementing e-filing and a user friendly electronic processing system would make a profound difference in how the courts operate.
I believe that some of these ideas are still being considered, but the problem is that there does not seem to be much patience for changes that are not a quick fix. I had hoped to move things further than we were able to, but we did make progress as I discussed.
As another example of a positive accomplishment, EOIR is now very effectively using more contractors for administrative support. This was started by Juan Osuna when he was Director of EOIR, and it has been highly successful. Because our growth has been so rapid, contract employees allow us to get top-notch people quickly, and gives us the flexibility to easily replace someone whose performance is not up to speed. Contractors are not a substitute for permanent employees, but can bridge the gap between a vacancy and a new hire. Once contractors have some experience, they can apply for permanent positions and by then, we have good knowledge of their skills and can hire experienced workers.
Finally, a major accomplishment was that I was the first female Chief Immigration Judge. Even though my experience was extensive, I still had to fight to get the job, including nine hours of interviews. At the time, I think I underestimated how much the workplace was still unaccustomed to women in particular positions. The emails I received after I left the job were astounding. Men and women alike wrote to tell me how much it meant to them to have a female CIJ.
Asylumist: How did things at EOIR change between the Obama Administration and the Trump Administration?
Judge Keller: Things now are unlike any time in the past. As I think we have been seeing throughout government during this Administration, the difference seems to be that there is now a fundamental distrust of people and organizations in the federal government. Over three decades, I have worked through a variety of administrations at all points on the political spectrum. Long-time federal employees are very accustomed to altering course when new administrations come in, whether or not the political parties change. Many employees and executives like me welcomed change as an opportunity to move their organizations forward and make the delivery of their services better. But if those in political power do not trust their subordinates and the functions of the agencies they run, it’s a very different and difficult scenario.
Some of the “small p” political pressure was happening by the end of the Obama Administration. For example, we saw this with children’s cases and the instruction we received from Justice Department leaders in political positions to prioritize those cases on our dockets. Still, in that instance, once the political goal was set, the best way to accomplish the goal, and even its ongoing feasibility, was largely left to senior staff in the agency with operational expertise to implement or to ultimately advise superiors that a different course of action might be needed. Now, very often both the political and the operational decisions down to the smallest details are dictated from above. For example, even my emails and communications to staff were edited from above. Aside from the very questionable advisability of having operational determinations made by persons with no operational expertise, this approach subjects the court process to claims that it is not neutrally deciding cases but instead deciding cases in the manner that political leaders would like.
Until recently, I had never really thought very hard about an Article I court for immigration cases. I thought that the line between politics and neutral adjudication was being walked. There was no major concern from my perspective about EOIR managers navigating that line. Now, the level of impact of political decisions is so extraordinary that I wonder whether we do need to remove the immigration courts from the Department of Justice. I’ve just started to seriously consider the validity of this idea and I need to do more research and thinking about it. The American Bar Association’s recommendations are very persuasive and of significant interest to me. Before, I would not have thought it necessary.
Of course, moving the Immigration Courts to Article I status would not solve all our problems, but it could free us from some of the questions that have been raised over the years about politicized hiring, how cases are being politically prioritized, and whether that is appropriate for a court.
Another large change came in our ability to talk to those we serve. To best function, you have to talk to stakeholders on both sides: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the private bar/respondents. This used to be standard procedure in past administrations, and it was done at both the upper and ground levels. Recently, such conversations were much more limited, and took place primarily at higher levels, often above my position and that of my Deputies. This change was touted as a way to streamline the Agency’s messaging system, but cutting off other forms of communication is detrimental, and I think EOIR has been hampered by our inability to talk at different levels to stakeholders.
We previously had a great relationship with the American Immigration Lawyers Association (“AILA”). For example, when I was working on conduct and professionalism for Immigration Judges, AILA was a great help. At the time, AILA’s message was the same as our message (poor conduct of adjudicators and representatives should be addressed), and we successfully partnered for a long time. Similarly, the CIJ previously had regular interactions with DHS’s Principal Legal Advisor and others in the DHS management chain, but that is no longer the case. Another change to the management structure that I believe was ill-advised was abolishing the “portfolio” ACIJs who bore targeted responsibility for several very important subjects to immigration court management: Judge conduct and professionalism, training, and vulnerable populations. In my experience, having officials whose specialized function was to oversee programs in these areas increased the integrity, accessibility, credibility, and efficiency of the court.
Asylumist: While you were CIJ, EOIR implemented quotas. IJs are now supposed to complete 700 cases per year. Can you comment on this?
Judge Keller: Many different court systems have performance goals and I am generally in favor of those. But the question is, How do you establish and implement them? Are you consulting the managers and IJs about it? How do you come up with the goals? Should they be uniform across the courts? The current requirements were not developed by me or my management team. Numeric expectations alone are not going to fix things. Timeliness is more important in my view than specific numbers. Moreover, the way that the emphasis is being placed on these numbers now sends the wrong message to both the parties and our judges and court staff. Also, court staff and stakeholders would more likely buy into such a change if they understood how the goal was developed, and why. My experience is that IJs are generally over-achievers and they want to do well and will meet or exceed any goals you set. In my view, completing 700 cases may be an appropriate expectation for some judges and dockets, and might be too high or even too low for others. Courts, dockets, and cases are vastly different from the southern border to the Pacific Northwest to the bigger cities, so I’m not sure about a one-size-fits-all approach.
Asylumist: What about the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”), also known as the Remain in Mexico policy. Can you comment on the effectiveness or efficacy of this program?
Judge Keller: The MPP began right before I left EOIR. In the MPP, as with all dockets, the role of the immigration court is simply to hear and resolve the cases that DHS files, but there were and still are, many legal and procedural concerns about the program. For example, what is the status of a person when they come across the border for their hearing, are they detained or not? Also, there were significant practical considerations. If you bring people across the border and plan to use trailers or tents for hearings, you need lines for IT equipment, air conditioning, water, bathrooms, etc. All that needs to be taken care of well in advance and is a huge undertaking. My impression of the MPP was that it was a political policy decision, which, even if an appropriate DHS exercise, is evidence of how asking the court to prioritize political desires impacts the overall efficiency of the court. The resources it required us to commit in terms of planning, and the resources it took away from the remaining existing caseload will likely contribute to further delay in other cases.
Asylumist: According to press reports, you and two other senior EOIR officials–all three of you women–were forced out in June 2019. What happened? Why did you leave?
Judge Keller: Unless there is something I don’t know about my two colleagues, none of us was forced out. I was not. We could have stayed in our same roles if we had chosen to do so. At the same time, I would not necessarily say that our departures were completely coincidental. I do know that the nature of our jobs had changed considerably.
For me, the previous level of responsibility was no longer there, and I did not have the latitude to lead the OCIJ workforce. My experience and management skills were not being used and I was mostly implementing directives. Any time three experienced, high-level executives depart an agency, there should be cause for concern. The fact that we were all women certainly raises a question, but EOIR has always been pretty progressive in that regard. Nevertheless, appropriate equal respect for women in the workplace is something that unfortunately still needs attention everywhere.
Leaving EOIR was a hard decision for me to make, and I think it was a big loss for EOIR that all three of us chose to exit.
The politicization of the court was also a concern for me. Historically, the Director of EOIR was always a career SES appointee, not a political SES. I viewed that as critically important, symbolically and practically, for a court system, especially one like the immigration court within the Executive Branch. Director James McHenry is in a career Senior Executive position. However, his path to the position was through the new Administration, which had detailed him from his position as a relatively new Administrative Law Judge to Main DOJ as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for a while before he became the Director. It appears that the large majority of his career otherwise was at DHS in non-managerial positions.
Successfully overseeing or managing an organization the size of EOIR with all of its challenges today would be difficult even for a seasoned executive with a lot of management experience.
The question at this time for EOIR is, How does your mission of fair adjudication of immigration cases fit within the broader immigration goals of the government? It takes deft and nuanced management to ensure the integrity of a court of independent decision-makers while maintaining responsiveness to political leaders. A good manager listens to people with expertise and is skilled at motivating others, getting the most from each employee, developing well-thought-out operational plans to reach policy goals, and even changing course if necessary. Under Director McHenry, the advice of the agency’s career executives was often not even solicited, and did not appear to be valued. His approach caused many to question the soundness of his operational decisions, and his commitment to the mission of the court, as opposed to accommodating the prosecutorial goals of DHS. I didn’t think there was as much focus on improving how we heard cases, as there was on meeting numeric goals and adjusting to the priorities of the DHS.
Asylumist: The BIA recently added six new members. All are sitting IJs and all had lower than average asylum approval rates. Do you know how these IJs were selected? What was the process?
Judge Keller: This was stunning. I can’t imagine that the pool of applicants was such that only IJs would be hired, including two from the same city. I think IJs are generally eminently qualified to be Board Members, but to bring in all six from the immigration court? I’d like to think that the pool of applicants was more diverse than that. At both the courts and the BIA, we used to get applicants for judge positions from academia, the private sector, BIA, and other governmental entities. More recently, we also had experienced judges and adjudicators from various other administrative systems, the military, and state and local courts applying to be IJs. I find these recent BIA hires to be very unusual.
I do not know the process for selection, but suspect that Board Chairman David Neal* had minimal input into these hires. I find this scenario very odd.
* Note: Since this interview took place, the Chairman of the BIA, David Neal, left his position and retired from the federal government. Before serving as Chairman of the BIA, David Neal held many other leadership positions at EOIR over many years, including the Vice-Chairman of the BIA and Chief Immigration Judge.
Asylumist: EOIR has made some moves to decertify the IJ union. Do you know why? What do you think about this?
Judge Keller: This happened after I left, but of course, it is easier to run an organization without people questioning you. Good managers recognize that you want opposing viewpoints. Maybe I am biased because I was a union officer, but I was also a manager longer than I was a union leader, and I’ve seen both sides. When I first learned that attorneys and judges were unionized, I was surprised, but I have seen the value of that. As a manager, the union is a great source of information. There are inherent conflicts between management and any union, but the union often has goals similar to those of management. The relationship between a union and management must be carefully developed, managed, and maintained. In the end, I felt it was worth the extra effort.
Now, I think management is more comfortable without public questions. I think decertifying is a mistake, particularly now when there are so many other changes that demand focus.
Asylumist: When he was Attorney General, Jeff Sessions gave a speech to EOIR where he claimed that most asylum cases were fake. This is also a line we frequently hear from the Trump Administration. What was your opinion of that speech?
Judge Keller: I think you may be referring to a press conference the Attorney General held at EOIR in October 2017. In a speech that day, the Attorney General said that the asylum system was “subject to rampant abuse and fraud.” That was disheartening. Fraud is not a factor in the large majority of cases. We know about fraud and we have been dealing with it probably since the inception of the immigration court. But it is not true that overwhelming numbers of asylum seekers are coming to immigration court trying to fraudulently obtain benefits. Whether the majority of their claims ultimately lack merit is a different question. But it is the very fact that we have a robust system to examine and decide asylum claims that makes our country a role model to others. I do not think statements like that made by the Attorney General are helpful to the court’s credibility. If IJs had that speech in mind in court, they would be labeled as biased, and bias is not a good thing for a judge or a court.
For the current Administration, I think there is an underlying skepticism about the extent to which the system is being manipulated. The process is indeed imperfect. But if you think that there are inappropriate “loopholes,” then we need to fix the law or the process. That is why comprehensive, or at least extensive, immigration reform has been discussed for so long. The Attorney General articulated some potential improvements he wanted to make, but also unfortunately focused in that speech on fraud and abuse, as if it was a problem greater than I believe it is.
When I would give my speech to new IJs, I would tell them that they would see the best and the worst of human nature in immigration court. As an IJ, you see persecutors and those who were persecuted; courageous individuals and liars. It is a huge responsibility. Therefore, you can’t go into court as an IJ and be thinking either that everyone is telling the truth, or that everyone is manipulating the process. You have to have an open, yet critical mind. It seems to me that Attorney General Sessions did not have a full appreciation for our particular role. This again brings us back to the idea of an Article I court, or some other solution to solidify the independence of immigration court adjudicators.
Asylumist: What do you think should be done about asylum-decision disparities? Does something need to be done?
Judge Keller: Yes. I think that asylum decision disparities should be evaluated by immigration court managers as they may be a sign of an underlying problem that may need to be addressed. However, I do not believe that they can or should be entirely eliminated.
If a judge is significantly out of line with his or her colleagues in the local court, it might be a red flag. Sometimes, simple things impact grant rates. For example, did the IJ miss some training in a particular area and is that affecting the grant rate? Is the judge assigned or does a court have a docket that by its nature (detained, criminal) will result in a higher or lower grant rate? Court managers should be alert to and manage those issues.
We’ve been looking at this issue for a long time. I remember talking about it with many EOIR leaders and judges over the last 10 years. But each case is different from the next and you don’t want decisions on asylum made according to mathematical formulas as if by computers. Decisions on such important human matters should be made by people who know the legal requirements, and can exercise sound judgment.
One way we thought about addressing seemingly significant disparities was temporarily assigning IJs with high or low grant rates to courts where the grant rates are different. Sometimes, the best way to evaluate your own opinions is to think through them with people who have different views. The hope was that judges would have the time and opportunity to reflect on their approach to asylum.
Once, former Director Osuna and I went to Chicago to visit the judges of the Seventh Circuit, which was at the time highly critical of our judges. We met with several of the Circuit Judges and talked about many things, including disparities in immigration court. We explained our approach to disparities, namely, addressing training needs, addressing any inappropriate conduct via discipline, and improving resources. One of the Circuit Judges mentioned that he was appreciative of our approach, and suspected that if anyone looked at it, there are probably similar disparities at the circuit court level too. As long as human beings are deciding immigration cases, there will always be some disparities. However, significant disparities should be evaluated and action taken only if the disparity is the result of something inappropriate, that is, something other than the proper exercise of independent legal judgment.
Asylumist: What is your hope for the future of EOIR?
Judge Keller: I hope EOIR can hold onto its core focus of hearing and deciding cases fairly and impartially. I also hope that the parties in the process know that we are listening to them. Parties in any court should feel that they’ve received a fair shake and a fair decision. They should understand the reasons why their cases were decided a certain way, and should not have to wait for years to get resolution. That is our reason for being – to deliver that service.
Earlier this month, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”)–the office that oversees our nation’s Immigration Courts–issued a Myths vs. Facts sheet, to explain that migrants are bad people and that most of them lose their asylum cases anyway.
I am always suspicious of “myths vs. facts” pronouncements, and to me, this one from EOIR seems particularly propaganda-esque (apparently the Washington Post Fact Checker thinks so too, as they gave the document two Pinocchios, meaning “significant omissions and/or exaggerations”). In terms of why EOIR created this document, one commentator has theorized that the current agency leadership is tired of answering the same questions and justifying its actions, and so they created a consolidated document that could be used whenever questions from the public or Congress come up.
EOIR has released a new “Myths vs. Facts” brochure.
This is a plausible enough explanation, but I wanted to know more. Lucky, I have a super-secret source inside EOIR itself. I met up with my source in a deserted parking garage, where he/she/it/they (I am not at liberty to say which) handed me a sealed envelope containing an additional sheet of myths and facts. These myths and facts didn’t make it into EOIR’s final draft. But now, for the first time, in an Asylumist exclusive, you can read the myths and facts that EOIR did not want you to see. Here we go:
Myth: Aliens who appear by video teleconferencing (“VTC”) equipment get just as much due process as anyone else. Maybe more. Fact: The video camera makes aliens who appear by VTC look 20% darker than their actual skin tone (the skill level of EOIR’s make-up crew leaves something to be desired). Since dark people are viewed as less credible and more dangerous, this increases the odds of a deportation order. Another benefit of VTC is that Immigration Judges (“IJ”) can turn down the volume every time an applicant starts to cry or says something the IJ doesn’t want to hear. This also makes it easier to deny relief. Fun fact: Newer model VTC machines come with a laugh track, which makes listening to boring sob stories a lot more pleasurable.
Myth: Immigration Judges don’t mind production quotas. In fact, most IJs keep wall charts, where they post a little gold star every time they complete a case. At the end of the month, the IJ with the most stars gets an ice cream. Fact: While some IJs relish being treated as pieceworkers in a nineteenth century garment factory, others do not. Frankly, they shouldn’t complain. EOIR recently commissioned a study, which found that a trained monkey could stamp “denied” on an asylum application just as well as a judge, and monkeys work 30% faster. Even for human judges, EOIR has determined that it really shouldn’t take more than 10 minutes to glance at an asylum case and write up a deportation order. At that rate, an IJ can deny six cases an hour, 48 cases per day, and 12,480 cases per year. Given these numbers, even IJs who insist on some modicum of due process should easily complete 700 cases per year (as required by the new production quota). And they better. Otherwise, it’s good bye homo sapien, hello pan troglodyte.
Myth: Aliens who participate in Legal Orientation Programs (“LOP”) spend an average of 30 additional days in detention, have longer case lengths, and add over $100 million in detention costs to DHS. Fact: Knowing your rights is dangerous. It might cause you to exercise them. And people who exercise their rights are harder to deport. EOIR is working on a new LOP, which will teach aliens how to properly respond to a Notice to Appear (“Guilty, your honor!”), how to seek asylum (“I feel totally safe in my country!”), how to seek relief (“I don’t need any relief – please send me home post haste!”), and how to appeal (“Your Honor, I waive my appeal!”). EOIR estimates that aliens who follow this new ROP will help reduce detention time and save DHS millions. The new ROP will help Immigration Judges as well. It’s a lot easier to adjudicate an asylum case where the alien indicates that she is not afraid to return home. And faster adjudications means IJs can more easily meet their production quotas – so it’s a win-win!
Myth: EOIR Director James McHenry got his job based on merit. He has significant prior management experience, and he is well-qualified to lead an agency with almost 3,000 employees and a half-billion dollar budget. Fact: James McHenry’s main supervisory experience prior to becoming EOIR Director comes from an 11th-grade gig stage-managing “The Tempest,” by William Shakespeare. In a prescient review, his school paper called the show “a triumph of the Will.” More recently, Mr. McHenry served as an attorney for DHS/ICE in Atlanta, and for a few months, as an Administrative Law Judge for the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer. In those positions, he gained valuable management experience by supervising a shared secretary and a couple of interns. When asked for a comment about her boss’s management skills, Mr. McHenry’s former intern smiled politely, and slowly backed out of the room.
Myth: In the EOIR Myths vs. Facts, the myths are myths and the facts are facts. That’s because the Trump Administration is always honest and credible when it comes to immigration. Fact: [Sounds of screeching metal and explosions]. Uh oh, I think we just broke the myths and facts machine…
So perhaps all is not as it seems. Sometimes, myths and facts get mixed up, especially in the Trump Administration, which has redacted human rights reports to show that countries are safe, buried other reports that don’t say what they like, and claimed that asylum lawyers are making up cases to get their clients across the border. It’s all in the grand tradition of the merchants of doubt, men and women who know better, but who obfuscate the truth–about tobacco, global warming, vaccines, whatever–to achieve a political goal (or make a buck). Why shouldn’t EOIR join in the fun? But to return to our friend William Shakespeare, I have little doubt that, eventually, the truth will out. The question is, how much damage will we do to migrants and to ourselves in the meantime?
Let’s say it’s your goal to deport as many people as you can get your hands on. You believe that most asylum seekers are fraudsters and you hope to make America great again by cutting programs like TPS and DACA in order to remove as many foreigners as possible. In other words, let’s say you are a member of the Trump Administration. In that case, will case completion quotas in Immigration Court help you achieve your goal?
Maybe if IJs were less lazy, they would complete more cases.
Superficially, it seems that they might. If Immigration Judges (“IJs”) are required to complete more cases, it makes sense that more people will be deported. Presumably with that goal in mind, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”)–the office that oversees the nation’s Immigration Courts–has recently created performance metrics to evaluate IJs based, in part, on the number of cases completed.
In order to achieve a “satisfactory” level of performance, IJs must now complete at least 700 cases per year, with less than a 15% remand rate (the “remand rate” is the percentage of decisions overturned by a higher court). IJs who complete between 560 and 700 cases “need improvement,” and IJs who complete less than 560 cases per year are deemed “unsatisfactory.”
For what it’s worth (a lot, in my opinion), the National Association of Immigration Judges (the IJs’ union) opposes the new plan because they fear quotas will infringe on the IJs’ independence. For its part, EOIR contends that using metrics to evaluate performance is “neither novel nor unique” and that it will “encourage efficient and effective case management while preserving immigration judge discretion and due process.”
I recently had the opportunity to speak to an IJ and a few court personnel about the new quotas, and they seemed nonplussed. In Baltimore, for example, I’m told that IJs with “regular” (as opposed to juvenile) dockets already complete well over 700 cases per year. The one IJ I spoke to said he completed 1,100 cases last year. Those number are well above average, according to the statistics I could find.
Five months into FY 2018, the nation’s IJs completed a total of 83,643 cases. Divide that by 330 judges, and you get an average completion rate for the U.S. of about 51 cases per month, or about 608 cases per year. Based on the statistics for Baltimore and my calculations (which are always suspect), the average IJ in that court will complete 855 cases this year. So why are Baltimore IJs so much more efficient than the national average?
As usual, I do not know. But looking at the case completion rates for other courts perhaps gives us a clue. In Miami-Krome, a detention center, the completion rate is about 739 cases per year per IJ. I would have expected a higher completion rate in a detention facility, as detained cases tend to move faster than non-detained (indeed, if you see a detained case file at EOIR, it will be labeled with a bold sign indicating “Rush–Detained at Government Expense”). Other detention facilities have even lower case completion rates: Eloy, AZ completes 658 cases per IJ per year, Harlingen, TX completes 516, and Elizabeth, NJ completes 457.
I suspect what’s going on with these variable rates has more to do with cases being venued to other courts than with IJ efficiency. In other words, many aliens in detention facilities are there because they were detained while trying to enter the U.S. Some percentage of these people are released, and then move to another part of the United States, where they pursue their cases. Thus, IJs near the border and at certain detention facilities (near airports or the border) tend to complete fewer cases because their cases are transferred to other courts. In my Baltimore example, there is no major detention facility nearby, and most people do not transfer their cases elsewhere. Hence, IJs in Baltimore tend to complete the cases that come before them.
The completion rate at other courts is more of a mystery. New York completes 540 cases per IJ per year, for example. LA completes only 477 cases per year (LA is near the border, so maybe some aliens are moving their cases to other jurisdictions).
In short, without better data, it is difficult to know what is going on. One thing does seem clear though: Grant rates vary significantly by court. Thus, for some IJs, the new quotas will be a non-issue. They already complete more than enough cases to earn the distinguished title of “satisfactory.” For other IJs, completing 700 cases, or even 560 cases, might be impossible. If so, the new quotas may force those judges to circumvent due process in order to fulfill EOIR’s mandate.
The new quotas raises other questions as well. The biggest one for me involves the anticipated influx of TPS and DACA recipients whose status has been terminated. It’s widely believed (including by yours truly) that many of these people will file for asylum rather than depart the United States. In an effort (probably futile) to dissuade such people from seeking asylum, USCIS has already re-ordered how cases will be processed, so that newly-filed cases will be interviewed first. If those cases are denied, they will be sent to court, where–according to one official I spoke to–they are supposed to be heard on an expedited basis. But how can that happen unless the court dockets are re-ordered? This “aimless docket reshuffling” (a termed coined by the inimitable Judge Schmidt) will pretty clearly interfere with the IJs’ ability to meet EOIR’s quotas.
So in the end, it seems that the new quotas will have no affect on some IJs, and dramatic affects on others. Whether overall completion rates will be improved, I have my doubts, especially if dockets are reshuffled to accommodate an influx of TPS and DACA recipients. I also have doubts about whether IJs who are forced to drastically increase their completion rates will be able to continue making decisions in accordance with due process of law. Sadly, the Trump Administration seems far more concerned about quantity than quality, and I fear that asylum applicants, immigrants, and our nation’s IJs will all suffer because of it.
In a little noted, but quite extraordinary move, the National Association of Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”) has asked Congress to protect its members (Immigration Judges) from the Trump Administration (their employer). The reason? The Trump Administration is seeking to “evaluate judges’ performance based on numerical measures or production quotas.” According to NAIJ, “If EOIR is successful in tying case completion quotas to judge performance evaluations, it could be the death knell for judicial independence in the Immigration Courts.” “Judges can face potential termination for good faith legal decisions of which their supervisors do not approve.”
EOIR is developing a more efficient way to adjudicate cases (and it comes with a free drink!).
Let’s start with a bit of background. NAIJ is a voluntary organization of United States Immigration Judges. It also is the recognized representative of Immigration Judges for collective bargaining purposes(in other words, the IJs’ union): “Our mission is to promote the independence of Immigration Judges and enhance the professionalism, dignity, and efficiency of the Immigration Courts, which are the trial-level tribunals where removal proceedings initiated by the Department of Homeland Security are conducted.”
According to NAIJ, the most important regulation governing IJ decision-making is 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b). This regulation requires that immigration judges exercise judicial independence. Specifically, “in deciding the individual cases before them, and subject to the applicable governing standards, immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases.” 8 C.F.R. §1 003.10(b).
Up until now, IJs were exempted from quantitative performance evaluations. According to NAIJ, “The basis for this exemption was rooted in the notion that ratings created an inherent risk of actual or perceived influence by supervisors on the work of judges, with the potential of improperly affecting the outcome of cases.”
The Trump Administration is now moving to change the way it evaluates IJs. The main reason for the change is the Administration’s goal of reducing the very-large backlog of cases in Immigration Court (currently, there are about 640,000 pending cases). The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR – the office that administers the nation’s Immigration Courts) recently announced a plan to “transform[] its institutional culture to emphasize the importance of completing cases.” In other words, EOIR will judge its judges based–at least in part–on the number of cases completed.
NAIJ has called this development “alarming” and a threat to judicial independence. Why? Because when judges are forced to complete a certain number of cases, they may be unable to devote the necessary time to each case. As a result, the ability to make proper, well-thought-out decisions will suffer.
This is already a problem in Immigration Court. One IJ famously quipped that his job involved adjudicating death penalty cases in a traffic court setting. And so pushing judges to do more cases in less time will potentially impact the alien’s due process rights, and the integrity of our Immigration Courts.
NAIJ has long believed that the system needs a “structural overhaul” and has advocated for converting the Immigration Courts into Article I courts. Article I refers to the first article in the U.S. Constitution, the section on legislative (i.e., Congressional) powers. The idea is that Congress would establish an independent immigration court, much like it created a tax court and a court of veterans appeal. Such a court would be independent of the Executive Branch–the branch of government tasked with enforcing immigration law (currently, IJs are employees of the Department of Justice, a part of the Executive Branch).
NAIJ recognizes that creating Article I immigration courts “may not be feasible right now,” but it nevertheless urges Congress to protect the nation’s IJs from the new Trump Administration policy:
Congress can… easily and swiftly resolve this problem through a simple amendment to the civil service statute on performance reviews. Recognizing that performance evaluations are antithetical to judicial independence, Congress exempted Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) from performance appraisals and ratings by including them in the list of occupations exempt from performance reviews in 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D). This provision lists ALJs as one of eight categories (A through H) of employees who are excluded from the requirement of performance appraisals and ratings. To provide that same exemption to Immigration Judges, all that would be needed is an amendment to 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2), which would add a new paragraph (I) listing Immigration Judges in that list of exempt employees.
The fact that IJs themselves are concerned about the Administration’s move is worrying. The Immigration Judges I know are conscientious and take their jobs very seriously (in contrast to the Trump Administration, which seems utterly lacking in seriousness). If EOIR is making it more difficult for IJs to do their duty, as they understand it, then something is clearly wrong.
Perhaps the IJs’ concerns are overblown. Maybe EOIR will implement the new case completion standards in a way that does not damage judicial independence or due process. But given the Administration’s track record in general, and the inexperienced acting director appointed to head EOIR, it’s difficult to have much confidence in the new policy. Since Congress is unlikely to act on NAIJ’s request for protection, I suppose we will see soon enough how these changes affect the Immigration Courts.
Finally, in my opinion, EOIR has largely misdiagnosed the problem. While some delay may be caused by IJs kicking the can down the road, or by aliens “playing” the system, most delay is systematic–it is caused by reshuffling Administration priorities, which affect how DHS and DOJ schedule cases. I doubt that imposing numerical quotas on IJs will do much to improve the situation. Other solutions–facilitating pre-trial conferences, reforming the Master Calendar system, better use of technology, imposition of costs, premium processing for certain applicants–might be more effective. Everyone agrees that reducing the backlog is a worthy goal, but case completion requirements are probably not the best way to achieve that end.
In a speech last week to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (the office that administers the nation’s immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals), Attorney General and living Confederate Civil War monument, Jefferson Beauregard Sessions, set out his views on the asylum system, asylum seekers, and immigration attorneys.
Jeff Sessions speaks to an audience at the Executive Office for Immigration Review.
Sad to say, Mr. Sessions described the asylum system in largely negative terms, and said not a word about the benefits that our country derives from offering asylum.
While he views our asylum policy as “generous,” and designed to “protect those who, through no fault of their own, cannot co-exist in their home country no matter where they go because of persecution based on fundamental things like their religion or nationality,” Mr. Sessions feels that our generosity is being “abused” and that “smart attorneys have exploited loopholes in the law, court rulings, and lack of resources to substantially undermine the intent of Congress.”
Mr. Sessions also lambasts “dirty immigration lawyers who are encouraging their otherwise unlawfully present clients to make false claims of asylum providing them with the magic words needed to trigger the credible fear process.”
Indeed, Mr. Sessions believes that our asylum system is “subject to rampant abuse and fraud.” Because the system is “overloaded with fake claims, it cannot deal effectively with just claims.”
First, it’s quite sad that our nation’s chief law enforcement officer would have such a jaundiced view of asylum. The idea that asylum is merely a generous benefit we offer to refugees, and that we receive nothing in return, is simply false. I’ve written about this point before, but it bears repeating. Asylum was created during the Cold War as a tool against the Soviet Union. We offered refuge to people fleeing Communism, and each person who defected to the West served as a testament to our system’s superiority over our adversary.
Now that the Cold War has ended, asylum still serves our strategic interests. It demonstrates our commitment to those who support and work for the values we believe in. It is tangible evidence that America stands with our friends. It gives our allies confidence that we will not let them down when times become tough. It shows that our foundational principles–free speech, religious liberty, equality, rule of law–are not empty words, but are ideals we actually stand behind.
And of course, there are the asylees themselves, who contribute to our country with their energy, enthusiasm, and patriotism, often born of their experience living in places that are not safe, and that are not free.
None of this came up during Mr. Sessions’s talk. Perhaps he does not know how our nation has benefited from the asylum system. Or maybe he doesn’t care. Or–what I suspect–he views asylum seekers as a threat to our security and a challenge to our country’s (Christian and Caucasian) culture.
The shame of it is that Mr. Sessions is demonstrably wrong on several points, and so possibly he reached his conclusions about asylum based on incorrect information.
The most obvious error is his claims that “dirty immigration lawyers… are encouraging their otherwise unlawfully present clients to make false claims of asylum providing them with the magic words needed to trigger the credible fear process.” Aliens who are “unlawfully present” in the U.S. are not subject to the credible fear process. That process is generally reserved for aliens arriving at the border who ask for asylum. Such applicants undergo a credible fear interview, which is an initial evaluation of eligibility for asylum. While this may be a technical point, Mr. Sessions raised the issue in a talk to EOIR, and so his audience presumably understands how the system works. That Mr. Sessions would make such a basic mistake in a speech to people who know better, demonstrates his ignorance of the subject matter (or at least the ignorance of his speech writers), and casts doubt on his over-all understanding of the asylum system.
Mr. Sessions also says that our asylum system is “overloaded with fake claims.” But how does he know this? And what exactly is a fake claim? In recent years, something like 40 to 50% of asylum cases have been granted. Are all those adjudicators being fooled? And what about denied cases? Are they all worthy of denial? There is, of course, anecdotal evidence of fraud—and in his talk, Mr. Sessions cites a few examples of “dirty” attorneys and applicants. But a few anecdotes does not compel a conclusion that the entire system is “subject to rampant abuse and fraud.” I can point to anecdotes as well. I’ve seen cases granted that I suspected were false, but I’ve also seen cases denied that were pretty clearly grant-worthy. While I do think we need to remain vigilant for fraud, I have not seen evidence to support the type of wide-spread fraud referenced by the Attorney General.
Finally, Mr. Sessions opines that “smart attorneys have exploited loopholes in the law, court rulings, and lack of resources to substantially undermine the intent of Congress.” So court rulings undermine the intent of Congress? Any attorney who makes such a statement casts doubt on that lawyer’s competence and devotion to the rule of law, but when the Attorney General says it, we have real cause for concern. Thousands of federal court rulings—including from the U.S. Supreme Court—have interpreted our nation’s immigration laws (and all our other laws too). That is what courts do, and that is how the intent of Congress is interpreted and implemented in real-world situations. Attorneys who rely on court decisions are not “exploit[ing] loopholes in the law,” we are following the law.
These are all pretty basic points, and it strikes me that when it comes to asylum, Mr. Sessions doesn’t get it. He seems not to understand the role of Congress, the courts, and lawyers in the asylum process. And he certainly doesn’t understand the benefits our country receives from the asylum system.
I’ve often said that President Trump’s maliciousness is tempered by his incompetence. With Attorney General Sessions, it is the opposite: His maliciousness is exacerbated by his incompetence. And I fear that asylum seekers–and our country’s devotion to the rule of law–will suffer because of it.
Atlanta, Georgia is generally considered to have the most difficult Immigration Court in the country. Now, the Trump Administration has tapped attorneys from the Atlanta Office of the Chief Counsel (the “prosecutors” in Immigration Court) to take charge of the Immigration Courts and the “prosecutors” offices for the entire United States. A third Atlanta attorney has been appointed to a key policy-making position at the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).
If you’re feeling down about Georgia exports, here’s something to love.
Before we get to those attorneys, let’s first talk about Atlanta. The average grant rate for asylum cases across the U.S. is just under 50%. The asylum grant rate at the Atlanta Immigration Court is less than 9%. Also, immigrant advocates have frequently complained about due process issues and the treatment of litigants in the Atlanta court.
It’s true that the Office of the Chief Counsel (“OCC”) and the Immigration Court are independent of each other, but I think we can safely glean a few things about the Atlanta OCC from what we know of the Court.
For one, since Immigration Judges will usually grant cases where the parties agree on relief, it seems likely that OCC attorneys in Atlanta rarely determine that a case should be approved for asylum. Of course, we do not know about the quality of the asylum cases in Atlanta—maybe they are unusually weak (a real possibility since sophisticated litigants will avoid Atlanta due to its low grant rate). But it would be strange indeed if almost no cases there meet the relatively low threshold required for asylum. The fact that the OCC is not stipulating to asylum on occasion indicates that they are taking a very hard line against such cases (this contrasts with many other jurisdictions, where the local OCCs regularly conclude that applicants qualify for asylum). The job of OCC attorneys is not merely to deport as many people as possible; they are supposed to do justice. This means agreeing to relief where it is appropriate. The low grant rate in Atlanta may indicate that OCC lawyers there are prioritizing “winning” over doing justice, and ideology above the law—all worrying signs as these attorneys move into national leadership positions.
Second, whether the asylum cases in Atlanta are strong or weak, I suspect that the high denial rate there colors the view of the OCC attorneys. If those attorneys believe that over 90% of asylum seekers are unworthy of relief—either because they do not meet the requirements for asylum or because they are lying about their claims—it seems likely that these attorneys will develop a jaundiced view of such cases, and maybe of immigrants in general.
Finally, there exists at least one instance of the Atlanta OCC taking an overly-aggressive position in a case involving alleged racial profiling by ICE (if OCC attorneys are the prosecutors, ICE officers are the police). In that case, an Immigration Judge in Atlanta ordered the OCC to produce an ICE agent accused of racial profiling. The OCC refused to produce the agent, and ultimately, the Judge ruled that the agents had engaged in “egregious” racial profiling and the OCC attorneys had committed “willful misconduct” by refusing to bring the agents to court. While the three OCC attorneys at issue here had left the Atlanta office by the time of this case, the OCC’s position again points to an agency willing to put “winning” ahead of justice.
With this background in mind, let’s turn to the alumnus of the Atlanta OCC who will be taking charge of our immigration system.
Tracy Short – ICE Principal Legal Advisor: Tracy Short is the new Principal Legal Advisor for ICE. In that capacity, he “oversees the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, the largest legal program within the Department of Homeland Security, comprised of more than 1,100 attorneys and 300 support professionals throughout the United States.” These are the attorneys who serve as “prosecutors” in Immigration Court, among their other tasks. According to his ICE biography, “From 2009 to 2015, Mr. Short served as the Deputy Chief Counsel in the ICE Atlanta Office of Chief Counsel.” Mr. Short also served on the committee staff for Congressman Bob Goodlatte, the staunch anti-immigration representative from Virginia.
While Mr. Short has impressive litigation experience, he has almost no management experience (as Deputy Chief Counsel, he might have supervised a few dozen people, at most). But now, under the Trump Administration, he is overseeing more than 1,400 lawyers and staff. Like his fellow veterans of the Atlanta OCC, I suspect he was chosen more for his ideological views than for his management background.
James McHenry – Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”): In a move characterized as “unusual” by retired Immigration Judge and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt, the Attorney General has appointed James McHenry as the new Acting Director of EOIR, the office that oversees the nation’s immigration court system. Judge Schmidt notes that, “While Judge McHenry has stellar academic and professional credentials, and is an ‘EOIR vet,’ having served as a Judicial Law Clerk/Attorney Adviser in the Buffalo and Baltimore Immigration Courts, it is unusual in my experience for the acting head of EOIR to come from outside the ranks of current or former members of the Senior Executive Service, since it is a major executive job within the DOJ.” In other words, while Judge McHenry has had significant legal experience, he has very little leadership experience, especially at EOIR.
Indeed, Judge Schmidt’s characterization of Judge McHenry as an “EOIR vet” seems overly generous. He served as a Judicial Law Clerk, which is basically a one or two year gig for new law school graduates working as an assistant to Immigration Judges (I myself was a JLC back in the prediluvian era) and he has a few months experience as an Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, an office at EOIR that reviews certain employment cases involving immigrants.
Like Mr. Short, Judge McHenry worked for the Atlanta OCC. He served as an Assistant Chief Counsel for ICE in that office from 2005 to 2010.
Whether Judge McHenry’s “acting” role as Director of EOIR will become permanent, we do not know. But I agree with Judge Schmidt that it is highly unusual for a person with such limited management experience to be picked to head our country’s immigration court system, with hundreds of judges and support personnel to oversee.
Gene Hamilton – Counsel to DHS Secretary: Gene Hamilton was appointed as counsel to DHS Secretary John Kelly. Along with Stephen Miller, he was apparently a key architect of the Trump Administration’s travel ban against people from several majority-Muslim countries. He also served as a trial attorney at the Atlanta OCC in about 2014 and 2015, though I could not verify his length of service there. In addition, Mr. Hamilton served on the staff of Senator Jefferson Beauregard Sessions before he was appointed Attorney General. Mr. Sessions, of course, is well known for his regressive views on immigration, civil rights, and just about everything else.
So there you have it. Three veterans of the Atlanta OCC who together will be exercising significant control over our country’s immigration system. Given their backgrounds and experience (or lack thereof), it’s difficult to be optimistic about how that system will fare under their watch.
I’ve written quite a bit in these pages about the backlog at the Asylum Offices, but today I want to focus on another backlog–in the Immigration Courts–and what can be done to improve the situation. The Court backlog has been a bit off my radar; I suppose because the Immigration Courts have always been slow, and so delay in that realm was the norm. But the fact is, the delays in Court have gotten worse. My furthest case is currently set for March 2019. I expect to travel to the Court in my hovercraft.
Maybe aliens can hire Doc Brown to get them to their Individual Hearings more quickly.
The basic problem for the Courts, and across the government, is money. Resources are limited and now, with a Congressional leadership hostile to immigration, it seems less likely that the budget for EOIR–the Executive Office for Immigration Review; the agency that oversees the Courts–will be expanded (though a new, anti-immigration bill pending in the House would create 50 new Immigration Judge positions). However, there are some reforms that could be implemented that would not require additional money from the government.
Below are a few suggestions. Some might require Congressional action; others would not. Given the current situation, something needs to be done. Perhaps some of these ideas would help alleviate the Court backlog:
– Impose Costs: Criminal and civil courts routinely impose costs and fines on people in the system, so why shouldn’t Immigration Courts do the same? There generally is only one reason that a person would have a case before an Immigration Judge–he violated the immigration law. Maybe the violation wasn’t his fault (think referred asylum seekers), and so a fine or payment of costs is not warranted, but the IJ can make this determination. The Immigration Court system is expensive, and it seems fair that people who are in the system because they violated the law should help pay for it. And of course, this money could be used to help improve the system.
– Premium Processing: Certain application before USCIS allow for premium processing. The applicant pays additional money and receives a faster decision (though not necessarily a better decision). Maybe the Immigration Courts could create some type of premium processing so that an alien could pay additional money to speed up her case. I have written about this idea in the context of the Asylum Office. The people who pay the premium processing fee would benefit the most from this plan, but the infusion of money into the system should benefit everyone.
With regard to the imposition of costs and premium processing, it seems a reasonable question to ask: Is this fair to people who cannot afford to pay? I suppose it is not, but America is not really a fair place. We are a liaise faire capitalist democracy. Every man for himself, and all that. We routinely fine the poor for being poor, and while I don’t like imposing costs in the immigration context, it is a way to improve the system for everyone–even those who cannot pay.
One last point here. Maybe one way to ease the burden would be to spread out the cost. If an alien is fined or forced to pay costs (to pay for the court, DHS, his own detention, etc.), those costs could be paid over time. Instead of receiving a green card, for example, the alien could receive a conditional green card that must be renewed every two years. As long as he continues to pay his debt, the card will be renewed.
– Empower DHS: DHS attorneys are overworked and lack the resources necessary to properly do their jobs. Adding additional staff to the various Trial Attorneys offices would allow DHS to review cases in advance. This would allow attorneys like me to file applications for relief in advance. DHS could then review the applications and–where appropriate–agree to the relief. Of course, DHS would not agree to relief in all cases, but in many cases, relief is not contested. If we could agree on relief in advance, we could remove the case from the Court’s docket, thus freeing space for other cases. Indeed, perhaps this could be combined with premium processing, so that the alien can pay a fee to DHS to review her case (and DHS could use this money to hire more staff). Maybe DHS could even meet with the alien to further explore whether relief is appropriate. If, after examining the case, DHS determines that relief is appropriate, it could inform the Court, which would then grant the relief without a hearing.
There has been some (tepid) movement in this direction, with prosecutorial discretion, but that does not go far enough. Aliens who are eligible for substantive relief do not want prosecutorial discretion; they want their cases granted. If DHS had the resources to review and decide cases in advance, it would help alleviate the backlog before the Immigration Courts.
– Pre-Master Calendar Hearings: Let’s face it, Master Calendar Hearings (“MCH”) are a huge waste of time. Why not require any alien who enters the system to attend a pre-MCH with a member of the Court staff (not an IJ). The pre-MCHs could be arranged by language group, so that everyone attending speaks the same language and the Court staff member could be fluent in that language (or have an appropriate interpreter). At the pre-MCH, the aliens would watch a video–in their own language–explaining the system and their rights (basically what the IJ repeats to pro se aliens 31 times each MCH). The staff member could answer basic questions and encourage the pro se aliens to find lawyers (basically what the IJ does 31 times each MCH). Aliens who will not use a lawyer can be scheduled for an in-person MCH, like what we have now. Aliens who say they will hire a lawyer will be given a deadline for the lawyer to enter her appearance (see the next suggestion for more on lawyers and MCHs). If the deadline passes, the alien will need to attend an in-person MCH.
– e-Master Calendar Hearings: EOIR now requires all attorneys to register and obtain an EOIR ID Number. As far as I can tell, EOIR does nothing with these ID numbers. However, it (supposedly) is a first step towards electronic filing. Federal courts across the United States require electronic filing, and I see no reason that the Immigration Courts should not do the same. Once an attorney enters her appearance, she should be able to go on-line and plead to the allegations and charges in the Notice to Appear (the charging document in Immigration Court). She should also indicate the relief sought. If there is some reason that the lawyer needs to see the IJ, she can request to appear at a regular MCH. But for the large majority of cases, all the pleadings and requests for relief could be done on-line. How, you ask, would this be an improvement over the current system, where lawyers can file written pleadings? At least in my experience, written pleadings are a huge pain in the tuchus. IJs often ignore them until the last minute, and we have to repeatedly call the Court to see whether the IJ will rule on them. So they really are not worth the trouble. If there was an easy electronic system that actually worked, and we could avoid MCHs, attorneys would be much inclined to use that system. It would save Court and DHS time, and it would also save attorney time and perhaps reduce costs for the alien.
OK, I suppose that is more than enough for now. If anyone at EOIR wants to hire me to implement these changes, you know where to reach me…
If you follow the news from the Executive Office for Immigration Review or EOIR–the office that oversees the Immigration Courts–you are aware of the recent lawsuit filed by Judge Afsaneh Ashley Tabaddor. Judge Tabaddor is an IJ in Los Angeles. She was appointed in 2005 and has been serving ever since. Judge Tabaddor also happens to be Iranian-American.
Judge Tabaddor has been mistreated by the executive Branch. We hope she doesn’t Leave. We are Root-ing for her.
According to Judge Tabaddor’s complaint against EOIR, trouble began for her in the summer of 2012 when the White House–considered by some a radical Muslim organization–invited her to attend a “Round Table with Iranian-American Community Leaders.” After some hemming and hawing over the nature of the event, EOIR granted the Judge leave to attend. But afterward, EOIR banned Judge Tabaddor from adjudicating cases involving nationals from Iran. So in other words, an Iranian American Judge who is active in her community is not permitted to hear cases where the alien is from Iran.
On it’s face, EOIR’s decision seems completely ridiculous and indefensible. It would be like forcing members of the National Association of Women Judges to recuse themselves in cases involving women, or stopping members of a Jewish judges association from hearing cases involving Jews, etc., etc. But can EOIR’s decision somehow be justified? Does it make sense to ban an Iranian-American who is involved in her community from hearing cases form Iran? Permit me to try to make that argument (as an asylum lawyer, tilting at windmills is my specialty).
Perhaps EOIR is concerned about the Judge because Iran is considered our enemy (or–on a good day–our rival). Allowing Judge Tabaddor to hear Iranian cases would be like allowing an American originally from the Eastern Block to serve in the White House during the Cold War (Zbigniew Brzezinski) or like allowing a German-American to lead the fight against Germany in WWI (John J. “Black Jack” Pershing) or against the Nazis in WWII (Major General Carl Spaatz). Hmm, maybe that argument doesn’t work so well after all. Let me put it another way. If you are at war with Japan, you’d better imprison all Japanese-Americans. Wait. Maybe that is not such a good argument either. Let’s try this a little differently.
It could be that EOIR is worried about the appearance of bias. Appearance is very important for judges. If an IJ is perceived as biased, it reduces our confidence in her decisions. It would be as if five Republican-appointed judges voted to end an election recount, giving the victory to the Republican presidential candidate. Oy. Let me give you a better example. Maybe it would be like allowing a Russian figure skating judge who is married to the director of the Russian Figure Skating Association to serve as a judge at the Sochi Olympics. And then the Russian skater miraculously wins. Harrumph. I guess that one doesn’t work too well either. Maybe we should look at the problem another way.
What if we assume that Judge Tabaddor is, in fact, biased in favor (or against) Iranian respondents. If that is the case, why should the recusal order be limited to cases from Iran? Iran and Iraq fought a war recently, so probably the IJ is biased against Iraq and should not hear cases from that country either. Iran also fought a war with Greece back in the day, and if I were Iranian, I’d still be bitter about the Battle of Thermopylae. So the Judge should also be banned from hearing cases involving Greeks, or at least Spartans. Iran has endured invasions by Mongols and Arabs, so Judge Tabaddor obviously should not hear Mongolian or Arab cases, and since Mongolians were mixed in pretty good with the Chinese, we’d better also ban her from Chinese cases–just to be safe. And of course, Iran doesn’t much like Christians, Baha’is or Jews, so the Judge should probably be kept away from cases involving those faiths. In addition, Iran has disputes with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Saudi Arabia. The Judge would have to be banned from hearing cases involving those nationals as well. And don’t even get me started about cases involving Israelis. So basically, if Judge Tabaddor is biased, as EOIR seems to assume, the only cases she should decide involve people from Guyana or New Zealand. And maybe São Tomé, but I’m not even sure that’s a country.
In the end, I really don’t know whether Judge Tabaddor’s lawsuit will succeed. IJs exist to implement the authority of the Attorney General. If the AG chooses to prevent certain IJs from reviewing cases from certain countries, that may be within his discretion. While the law may not be clear (at least to me), I have no doubt about which side is right. If an IJ behaves in an inappropriately biased manner, she should be removed from her job. But where–as here–there seems to be no question as to the Judge’s integrity, her docket should not be restricted in this insulting and discriminatory way.
If you are an attorney or an immigrant with a case before the Immigration Court, you’ve probably noticed that the computer system has been down for almost two weeks. The phone system for checking case status is not working, and there are all sorts of problems at the courts and the BIA. Apparently, the cause of these difficulties is that some servers in Fairfax, Virginia are broken and cannot easily be repaired. No one seems to know why this happened, and EOIR (the Executive Office for Immigration Review) is not telling us much. The EOIR website says only that they are experiencing a “hardware failure.”
EOIR computer techs are working day and night to solve the problem.
As a public service, I have decided to step in and fill this information gap with unfounded speculation. I figure that if I take the time to write something down, people might as well believe it. So to all those waiting for the system to start up again, take comfort. I present to you the top 10 reasons that the EOIR computers are not working:
10. Juan Osuna forgot to pay the electric bill.
9. The Y2K bug finally kicked in.
8. The computer shut itself down after it played 35 million games of tic-tac-toe and learned that it is impossible to “win” a removal case.
7. It is getting more and more difficult to find new vacuum tubes and punch cards.
6. Once the computer calculated that the average time to the next hearing exceeds the life expectancy of the average respondent, it decided there was no point and turned itself off.
5. Everyone who signed up for Obamacare has accidentally been deported.
4. Someone asked the computer to figure out how the Asylum Clock works, and it blew up.
3. Joe Arpaio arrested the computer for helping “illegals” remain in the U.S.
2. If you build a 500 gigabyte computer, someone will file a 501 gigabyte case.
1. Everyone who knows how to fix a computer has already been deported.
There you have it. Some of these explanations may even prove to bear a relationship to reality. If so, remember that you heard it here first.
The New York Times recently reported on a new policy at the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) designed to prioritize the removal of criminal aliens. Under the policy, DHS will review cases and terminate proceedings for aliens deemed a low priority for removal. At the same time, EOIR (the Immigration Courts) will re-arrange its dockets to expedite priority cases. From December 4, 2011 to January 13, 2012, EOIR will be implementing the Prosecutorial Discretion Pilot Project in Baltimore and Denver. The results for aliens seeking asylum are already pretty devastating, and if the program goes national in its present form, we can expect serious problems for many asylum seekers.
Some experiments have unintended consequences.
My first experience with the program came last week when we received notice that my client’s Individual Hearing was re-scheduled from this December to May 2014 (yes, that is 2014, almost 2.5 years from now). The man is an Eritrean national who fled persecution in his homeland. He has a decent case and he had been hoping for a resolution later this month. Now he must wait until 2014. He has no work permit and the Asylum Clock is stopped in his case.
According to EOIR, the goal of the Pilot Program is “to ensure that [limited] resources are focused on the Administration’s highest immigration enforcement priorities.” Unfortunately, in this case, the Administration’s “enforcement priorities” (i.e., removal of aliens) comes at the expense of our country’s humanitarian obligations.
Part of the problem, I think, is the government’s attitude, articulated by the Supreme Court in INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992), that “every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.” I have always felt that this statement reflects an insensitivity and ignorance about many aliens who are in the U.S. While some aliens do merely hope to delay their removal, asylum seekers wish to see their cases resolved as quickly as possible. There are a number of reasons for this: Asylum seekers are hoping to petition for their family members, some of whom face threats in the home country; asylum seekers fear return to their country, and waiting for years to learn their fate is extremely stressful; many asylum seekers are young and hope to study in university, which is difficult without lawful status; many asylum seekers are well educated and hope to find professional jobs, which is also difficult without status.
For all these reasons, delaying asylum hearings for 2+ years is devastating to many asylum seekers.
The Pilot Program is going forward, and I imagine that the same or similar policies will be adopted throughout the U.S. Given this new reality, here are a couple suggestions about how EOIR can mitigate the difficulty to asylum seekers and other aliens who are hoping for a resolution of their cases:
– When an asylum case is postponed, the Asylum Clock should start automatically, so that the asylum seeker can obtain her work permit.
– EOIR should reserve some time slots in the (relatively) near future for asylum seekers and others whose cases have been postponed. Aliens that wish to have a sooner resolution of their cases can file motions to expedite. Thus, for example, if EOIR reserved some time slots in 2012, my 2014 client could file a motion requesting one of those dates.
Finally, while it might be futile to argue that we should not be prioritizing removals over protecting people fleeing persecution, I want to give it a try. Statistically, most removals involve people with no criminal histories. Even many “criminal aliens” are convicted of very minor violations (driving without a license, using a false ID, and drunk in public are three common violations). The benefit to the U.S. of removing these people quickly–and often separating them from their family members–is pretty minimal. On the other hand, as discussed above, the harm of leaving legitimate asylum seekers in limbo for long periods is severe. If these competing interests are balanced, it seems unjust that asylum seekers should never receive priority over the removal of “criminal aliens.” EOIR should re-think its policy to account for the needs of legitimate asylum seekers.
